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A Tale of Three Families:
Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and
Natural Connections
Allison Anna Tait*
Cases targeting family regulation in the 1970s turned, for the first time, on three
contrasting and sometimes competing theories of the family: historical households,
earned belonging, and natural connections. This Article introduces and defines these
three theories and offers a descriptive account of how the theories were used by litigants
and the Supreme Court alike to measure discrimination, evaluate the rights of
individual family members, and, often, increase household equality. The theory of
historical households, developed with great success by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, invoked
a Blackstonian family defined by gender hierarchy and the law of coverture, and
posited that this model was in need of legal reordering. Earned belonging, offered by
Ginsburg as a replacement for historical households, presented a new and more
democratic family theory centered on ideas of conduct-based outcomes. The earned
belonging theory proposed that an individual could earn her full place in the family
through positive conduct and performance. The theory of natural connections, on the
contrary, promoted received wisdom about family ordering based on biologic “truths”
about sex-based differences. Courts operating according to natural connections theory
privileged maternal rights, rejected many paternal claims, and affirmed laws promoting
the nuclear, or natural, family. The work of this Article is to present a new and
synthetic reading of cases about wives, illegitimate children, and unwed fathers that
follows these three logics, revealing how they weave together and why earned belonging
provides the strongest support for Ginsburg’s original vision of an equalized
household.

* Gender Equity and Policy Postdoctoral Associate, Yale Women Faculty Forum; J.D., Yale
Law School, 2011. I owe particular thanks to Joan Williams for inviting me to contribute to this issue
and for her many helpful comments. Many thanks also to Ann Alstott and John Langbein for early
comments that were useful in shaping the Article; to Judith Resnik for her thoughts, suggestions, and
continual support; to Brian Soucek for his feedback; and to Luke Norris for never tiring of talking
about the Article or reading revisions. Thanks also to the editors for their wonderful work bringing
this Article to publication.
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Introduction: The Three Logics of the Family
1
Every family has a story. And whether happy or unhappy, small or
large, every family faces similar questions about household governance,
the permeability of family boundaries, and the allocation of resources.

1. With this statement, I invoke Tolstoy, who famously began Anna Karenina with the sentence,
“All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Leo
Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 1 (Louise Maude & Aylmer Maude trans., Oxford Press 1995) (1877).
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Courts, when asked to intervene, have reasoned through cases about
rights based in the family using various arguments and doctrines about
marriage and the best interests of the child to determine benefit
allocation, custody, and marital rights. This Article proposes the idea
that cases targeting family regulation in the 1970s turned, for the first
time, on three contrasting—and sometimes competing—theories of the
family in order to determine questions of discrimination, gender
typecasting, and the scope of family inclusion. The three blueprints for
the family—invoked by advocates and the Supreme Court alike—were
theories about historical households, earned belonging, and natural
connections. This Article introduces and explicates these three theories
for family ordering and subsequently explores the contexts in which they
appeared—cases about economic entitlements for husbands and wives,
cases about the economic rights of illegitimate children, and cases
involving the parenting rights of unwed fathers—offering a new and
synthetic reading of these cases based on the theories of the family that
are intricately woven through them.
The three forms of logic, which defined the parameters as well as
the stakes of family inclusion, first appeared together and coalesced as
parts of a dialogue about family in the 1970s. Between 1968 and 1972,
2
3
4
three cases—Levy v. Louisiana, Reed v. Reed, and Stanley v. Illinois —
all came before the Supreme Court and set the stage for deliberation
over rights within the family and family belonging. Leveraging equal
protection and due process claims, Reed, Levy, and Stanley formed a
triumvirate that heralded a new period of debate about the family and
marked a new phase of advocacy efforts to end the multiple forms of
separate spheres that restricted family equality. The trio of cases also
marked a new phase of judicial understanding about the family, brought
about by the Court’s confrontation of a range of claims made by wives,
illegitimate children, and unwed fathers. The Court connected these
seemingly dissimilar claims in synthetic ways, referencing each in
discussion of the other and generating a rich analysis about the family as
a working unit. During this time—the decade ushered in by Reed, Levy,
and Stanley and defined by the cases that followed—the three theories of
historical households, earned belonging, and natural connections were
very much at the forefront of conversation. These three logics, deployed
by advocates and the Court, shaped the contours of conversation,
determined the outcome of cases, and set in place the architecture of
family definition.

2. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
3. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
4. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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A. Historical Households
The theory of the historical household posited an outdated,
5
Blackstonian image of family, regulated by the master-servant
6
relationship as embedded in domestic relations law, and proposed that
this household was antiquated, out of step with the modern social
landscape and in need of legal reordering. Arguing from history enabled
the conclusion that the discriminatory legal architecture of the family was
the product of a past bias, stemming from historical contingency and not
essential reason. This argument from history was substantively
developed and favored by Ruth Bader Ginsburg as an advocate and
litigator. At the helm of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg
continually pushed the Court to reject the historical form of the
household and acknowledge the shifting cultural landscape of marriage
7
and family. Social change driven by economic need and cultural trends—
women entering the workforce and the decline of the traditional family—
8
gave substance to these claims for reordering. As Ginsburg wrote,
“Changes pervasively affecting society set the stage. By the late 1960’s, a
9
revived feminist movement spotlighted those changes.” By the 1970s,
Ginsburg—using the historical household theory—suggested it was time
to modify and reform the ossified legal system that regulated family
10
interactions and household rights.
Accordingly, Ginsburg struck out against this system with her vision
of equal citizenship and an equalized household. Ginsburg’s goal, aligned
with a broad feminist push to reshape the family, was to “open up that
institution to critical scrutiny and question the justice of a legal regime
that . . . permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family
5. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England 430 (Robert Bell ed.,
Layston Press 1967) (1765). For a treatise on the law of husband and wife in the American context, see
James Clancy, A Treatise of the Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Husband and Wife 1 (photo.
reprint 2010) (1828).
6. For a discussion of the original master-servant orientation of family law as well as its
transformation, see Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part I, 23 Yale J.L. &
Human. 1, 2 (2011).
7. See infra Part I.
8. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,
1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 167–68.
9. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451, 457 (1978).
10. Family law was not the only legal domain in which ossified statutes riddled the books. For
example, the 1970s saw the demise of mortmain statues in a number of states through either legislative
repeal or a ruling of unconstitutionality. See Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the
United States, 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 407, 458 (1992). Guido Calabresi describes the phenomenon as
“Choking on Statutes” and discusses the judicial role in addressing legal obsolescence, as he calls the
problem of outdated statutes. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1
(1982). Calabresi writes about the use of constitutional law, and the equal protection doctrine in
particular, to remedy these obsolescences. In this context, Calabresi mentions sex discrimination cases,
in particular Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb, and mentions the Court’s debate over whether or not the
statutes in question were “archaic.” Id. at 9–10.
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11

members to others.” In litigating cases, Ginsburg both uncovered
discriminatory historical practices and gave the Court the tool of
historical analysis with which to understand social change. “Ginsburg’s
antistereotyping approach was not simply hostile to sex classification or
sex differentiation; she opposed traditional sex stereotypes insofar as they
were part of a system of social roles and understandings that anchored
12
women’s inequality.” The goal was to “liberate individuals and families
13
from the paternalism of the previous era,” and Ginsburg developed
“new claims voiced in terms of individual rights, autonomy, and
14
equality.” The civil rights movement provided a model for new equality
claims, and the women’s rights movement introduced that model into the
household, transforming the home into a locus of substantive
transformation and exemplary social reordering.
History, Ginsburg taught her colleagues and members of the Court,
was a way of marking change, a method for identifying disjunctive
moments when law did not match social realities, and a tool for revealing
the constructed quality of gendered assumptions. And while history
certainly had other uses and senses, this was the dominant set of
meanings mobilized by Ginsburg in her argumentation before the
Supreme Court. Ginsburg, reviewing the work of the Court in the 1970s,
wrote, “[T]he Supreme Court . . . has been tugged in a new direction by
arguments urging accommodation of constitutional doctrine to a changed
15
social climate.” It was Ginsburg herself who tugged the Court in the
direction of overturning history, suggesting that household regulation
should mirror contemporary and actual practice rather than historical
16
assumption and inherited conventions.
B. Earned Belonging
The second vector of analysis, promoted by both advocates and the
Court as a measure of the rights of individual family members, was the
idea of earned treatment and belonging. The earnings argument was a
new argument putting forth the idea that even though individuals
acquired family relationships through birth and marriage, they truly
earned legal rights of family belonging and resource sharing though
11. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 Fam. L.Q. 475, 475 (1999).
12. Reva Siegel & Neil Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J., 771, 789–90 (2010).
13. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family Law,
1890–1990, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 273, 289 (1995).
14. Id.
15. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 171. Ginsburg also noted that the path to progress was rocky
because “original understanding” presented a counterweight to doctrinal change. Id. “It is more
difficult to elaborate bold doctrine regarding sex discrimination when even a starting point is
impossible to anchor to the constitutional fathers’ design.” Id. at 172.
16. See infra Part I.

Tait_63-HLJ-1365 (Do Not Delete)

1350

6/24/2012 8:25 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
17

[Vol. 63:1345

personal investment and conduct. At its core, the earnings theory was
one of earned treatment, just reward, and conduct-based regulation. The
earnings theory was especially useful at this point in time because it
provided an alternative to the historical household argument. Often both
advocates and the Court proffered it to fill the void left when historical
household regulation was found to be unconstitutional and impermissibly
discriminatory. Earnings theory was a replacement for historical
households, a new and more democratic family theory that centered on
ideas of economic justice and reward for hard work.
Ginsburg promoted the earnings logic in the Reed brief, stating the
18
case for “women seeking to be judged on their individual merits.”
Invoking the race analogy in the context of equal protection, Ginsburg
explained the replacement of history with earnings: “Through a process
of social evolution, racial distinctions have become unacceptable. The
old social consensus that race was a clear indication of inferiority has
19
yielded to the notion that race is unrelated to ability or performance.”
The status of women, Ginsburg argued, was undergoing the same
transformation—from social consensus that gender confined a woman to
the home and an inferior position both within and outside of the
household to more modern notions of performance-based assessment—
and therefore deserved legal protection. Women deserved, according to
this logic of earnings, to have their work valued equally with the work of
men; likewise, wives and husbands were entitled to equal statutory
benefits because each spouse had invested labor and worked hard to
provide comfort and security for the other.
It was no different with the status of illegitimate children.
Reiterating the holding of the Supreme Court that “[d]istinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
20
of equality,” advocates for illegitimate children proposed that it was
time to replace history with earnings. The Court agreed and spelled out
the argument very clearly in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
with Justice Powell writing that “imposing disabilities on the illegitimate
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
21
wrongdoing.” Illegitimate children were entitled to family benefits
because they were participating—and blameless—members of an
informal family unit. These “hapless children” who suffered from unjust

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.
Brief for Appellant at 10, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
Id. at 16.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
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22

“social opprobrium” had done nothing to earn their marginal social
status or being barred from recovering the same economic benefits
legitimate children received. Wives and illegitimate children had, in this
view, earned the right to be judged according to merit just as they had
not earned the penalties accorded to them because of stereotyping and
bias. The earnings theory provided a new standard for family
participation and inclusion, and introduced the idea that an individual
could earn her full place in the family (and her right to family resources)
through positive conduct and performance.
C. Natural Connections
The natural connections argument represented a logic on the
opposite end of the spectrum from the historical household logic,
promoting received wisdom about gender roles and family ordering
based on biologic “truths” about sex-based differences. The theory of
natural connections embraced motherhood, rejected many forms of
paternal involvement in child rearing, and vigorously protected the
model of the nuclear, or natural, family. “The nuclear family,” in
determinations made using the natural connections theory, was
23
“sanctified as neutral, essential, and inevitable.” According to this
theory, the nuclear family represented nature expressed in family design.
24
This “traditional legal family” —which was, of course, a historical
25
construct in its own right —“counted as sacred because it expresse[d]
and reformulate[d] images of ‘appropriateness’ or ‘naturalness’ found in
26
the larger society.” These notions of naturalness in the family correlated
with sociocultural values of “monogamy, procreation, industriousness,
27
[and] insularity.” The nuclear or natural family was based primarily on
an established sexual tie between a man and woman, and the Court paid
serious attention in the adoption cases to the relationship between the
mother and father, making plain “[c]onstitutional doctrine’s clear

22. Id. at 176.
23. Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law
and Society, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 387, 390. Martha Fineman writes that the
veneration of the nuclear family is coercive, with the state through its regulatory
mechanisms (whether they be the criminal justice system, child welfare laws, or tax codes
and other regulatory civil laws) defining and securing for the nuclear family a privileged if
not exclusive position in regard to the sanctified ordering of intimacy.
Id. at 388–89.
24. Id. at 390.
25. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. Chi.
Legal F. 1, 2. Fineman states that the nuclear family was “[d]efined initially through religious precepts
in ecclesiastical courts in England” and historically constructed from there. Id.
26. Fineman, supra note 23, at 390.
27. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 Yale L.J. 1236, 1256–57
(2010).
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preference for the marital nuclear family above other alternatives.” The
parental relationship also constituted a major part of the nuclear family,
and the other natural relationship that held great purchase in judicial
reasoning was the mother-child relationship. Opinions in the adoption
cases cited to anthropological literature positing a unique relationship
between a mother and her child—a relationship not available to the
father—and repeated supposed common knowledge that unwed fathers
29
were uninterested parents.
Reasoning about natural family connections and the natural family
unit provided a form of judicial analysis to counter the historical
household theory. Primarily, the natural family theory came up in the
context of unwed fathers and their rights to block adoptions or gain
30
custody rights. Analyzing cases about the rights of unwed fathers, the
Court focused not on the arc of history but rather on the state of nature.
If history had any place in this analysis, a quick scan of custom reinforced
for the Court the idea that an unwed father’s historical positioning
neither encouraged nor tolerated the unwed father to become a parent.
History, in the context of the unwed father, did not lay bare aged
constructs of discrimination but rather confirmed the naturalness of
conventional assumptions.
The natural connections argument also highlighted the limits of the
earnings argument, overcoming evidence of earned belonging with
truisms about the natural—and different—characteristics of men and
women as parents. The earnings criteria often worked against unwed
fathers and confirmed their role as nonparticipants in the family. Some
adoption cases suggested that unwed fathers had not earned a right to
contest the adoption of their children because they had not contributed
sufficient income or other resources to the family unit. These same cases
also suggested that the unwed father had failed to earn the right to
parenthood because he had failed to belong to the nuclear family in a
cognizable way—engaging in a marriage-like relationship with the
31
mother and being a parent of the daily household.
The work of this Article, then, is to follow these three logics through
the cases about wives, illegitimate children, and unwed fathers, uncovering
when and how they thread together. Part I of the Article is an analysis of
the historical household theory at work in many of the cases that Ruth
Bader Ginsburg helped to litigate while at the helm of the ACLU’s

28. Id. at 1252. Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray posit the importance and primacy of the
“marriage model” in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. (“As a general matter, marriage historically
has been a conduit to family formation, as law channeled individuals (and their sexual behavior) into
marriage, and from marriage into coupled parenthood.”).
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part III.B.
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Women’s Rights Project. In the brief for Reed, Ginsburg set out the
historical argument for modern gender equality, and subsequent cases
continued to showcase the historical discrimination that women suffered,
particularly the economic disability inflicted on women by outdated
coverture laws. Part II offers a reading of the illegitimacy cases, starting
with Levy, and explores the full articulation of the earned belonging
theory. This Part analyzes how these cases cemented the rights of
illegitimate children by affirming the unearned nature of their unequal
treatment. Part III of the Article addresses the unwed father cases and
the alternate analytic framework of natural connections that the Court
used in considering the question of adoption rights. This Part illustrates
how the natural connections theory countered the historical household
and limited the effectiveness of earned belonging. The Article introduces
and defines three theories of the family and then offers a descriptive
account of how these theories were used by litigants and the Court to
increase household equality, measure discrimination, and evaluate the
rights of individual family members. The Article investigates the benefits
as well as the burdens of these logics individually and describes how and
at what points they intersect, ultimately suggesting a normative
preference for family design based the ideology of earned treatment and
intimate investment.

I. Husbands, Wives, and Home Economics
Spearheading and collaborating with colleagues to effect much of
the change that transformed the household in the 1970s was Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. A scholar of civil procedure and a comparativist who was
interested in Sweden, Ginsburg created the ACLU Women’s Rights
32
Project in 1972 and was at the forefront of gender litigation in the 1970s.
Ginsburg wrote numerous briefs for Supreme Court cases, argued
frequently before the Supreme Court, and still continued to publish as a
33
legal and constitutional scholar. Excelling in each of these roles, her
vision of an equalized household was a guiding compass in the project of
dismantling the barriers that created separate domains for different
categories of family members. A pioneer in bringing sophisticated
understandings of gender politics to law, Ginsburg’s vision of gender
equality held that men and women would “create new traditions by their
actions, if artificial barriers [were] removed, and avenues of opportunity
34
held open to them.” A first step in instantiating this vision was getting
32. See Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU (Mar. 7, 2006),
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff.
33. Carol Pressman, The House That Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and
Justice, 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 311, 314–15 (1998).
34. Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based
Discrimination: Text, Cases, and Materials, at xii–xiii (1974).
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the Court to strike down “[t]housands of state laws, most of them historical
35
hangovers, [that] typecast men and women.” Litigating Reed v. Reed was
an important opening move. Reed gave Ginsburg the full opportunity to
articulate both her analysis of historical gender discrimination as well as
36
her understanding of the untenable way in which “historical hangovers”
were negatively impacting women’s equal opportunity. Reed was a
foundational underpinning in Ginsburg’s strategy to equalize the rights
held by men and women with respect to home management and
economy. The broad goal was nothing less than the disruption and end of
coverture law.
A. REED V. REED: Dismantling the Historic Household
The facts in Reed were simple and allowed Ginsburg to press
forcefully on the idea of legal “historical hangovers.” When Richard
Lynn Reed, the adopted son of Sally and Cecil Reed, died intestate on
March 29, 1967, his parents—and only heirs—were separated and living
37
apart. Sally Reed went to the Ada County courthouse in Idaho and filed
her petition for probate of her son’s estate, requesting that she be named
38
administrator of his estate. Cecil Reed also petitioned the court for
39
letters of administration. The probate court entered an order appointing
Cecil Reed administrator, noting that each of the parties was equally
40
entitled to letters of administration under the Idaho probate code, but
that the probate code also entitled Mr. Reed to preference on account of
41
his sex. The relevant provision in the probate code stated: “Of several
persons claiming and equally entitled . . . to administer, males must be
preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the half
42
blood.” Sally Reed appealed and the Idaho district court reversed the
order of the probate court on the grounds that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Cecil Reed subsequently appealed to the Supreme
43
Court of Idaho, who reversed the district court, and the case finally
made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Writing the brief for the Supreme Court case, Ginsburg began with
a substantive overview of the historical landscape informing the
gendered partitioning of separate spheres. Citing to Blackstone’s famous

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 174.
Id.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71 (1971).
Id. at 71–72.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. (quoting Idaho Code Ann. § 15-314 (1942)).
Id. at 74.
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44

formulation of coverture as well as to Tennyson’s verse, Ginsburg hit
the historical note, observing that the “common law heritage, a source of
pride for men, marked the wife as her husband’s chattel, ‘something
45
better than his dog, a little dearer than his horse.’” That concept of
family governance, she suggested, still held strong in the modern
formulation of “head of the family” and served as an organizing principle
for family life. In many states, Ginsburg pointed out, “head of
46
household” statutes were still on the books. An Idaho statute, on the
books at the time, stated that: “The husband is the head of the family. He
may choose any reasonable place or mode of living and the wife must
47
conform thereto.” These laws—holdovers from coverture—were
ubiquitous in both federal and state statutory regulation and gave men,
as heads of household, all rights of family governance, including the right
48
to choose a domicile and the right to manage and allocate family assets.
In contrast, married women suffered from a range of disabilities due to
their status as wives. Wives had limited ability to engage in independent
business outside the home (following the historic sole trader laws) and
often were unable to act as full and independent financial agents, for
49
example as a guarantor for assets. An appendix to the Reed brief listed
nine areas, ranging from the right to determine domicile to the preference
for males in guardianship of minors and as estate administrators, in
which coverture law embedded in statutes still detrimentally affected
50
married women.
Case law, Ginsburg suggested, was little better, and the common law
tradition also made manifest the discrimination and typecasting that
51
continued to plague women, most especially married women. Only a
decade before Reed, in Hoyt v. Florida, the Court had stated that the
52
“woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.” Citing
other examples of the “Victorian” thinking that still held sway in the
form of persistent gender stereotyping, Ginsburg also referred to
53
Goesaert v. Cleary, in which the Court had upheld a Michigan law

44. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 27–28. Blackstone’s formulation of coverture was that
“the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.”
1 Blackstone, supra note 5, at 442; see Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 28.
45. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 27 (citing Alfred Lord Tennyson, Locksley Hall, in
Poems (1842)).
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. (quoting Idaho Code Ann. § 32-902 (1942)).
48. See, e.g., id. at 69–88.
49. See id. at 60–65.
50. Id. at 69–88.
51. See id. at 41–54.
52. 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
53. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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prohibiting women from serving as bartenders (but allowing them to be
waitresses in a bar): “The majority opinion in Goesaert reflects an
antiquarian male attitude towards women—man as provider, man as
54
protector, man as guardian of female morality.” Both statutes and cases,
Ginsburg concluded, “illustrate [that] the law-sanctioned subordination
of wife to husband, mother to father, woman to man, is not yet
55
extinguished in this country.” Historic household status was still
circumscribing the place and power of modern women who, Ginsburg
believed, deserved a position within and opportunity outside of the
household equal to men.
Clarifying the notion that this historical discrimination was based on
nothing other than the accident of gender and bolstering the idea of
historical discrimination’s modern inappositeness, Ginsburg’s approach
was to put the analogy between race and gender front and center.
Drawing on the work of Pauli Murray, Ginsburg wrote that “[l]egal and
social proscriptions based upon race and sex have often been identical,
and have generally implied the inherent inferiority of the proscribed class
to a dominant group. Both classes have been defined by, and
56
subordinated to, the same power group—white males.” The relationship
between the two identity groups was more, however, than a strict
historical transference of race-based claims into the domain of gender.
Ginsburg suggested that there was a fluid boundary between the two
groups:
[H]istory of western culture, and particularly of ecclesiastical and
English common law, suggests that the traditionally subordinate status
of women provided models for the oppression of other groups. The
treatment of a woman as her husband’s property, as subject to his
corporal punishment, as incompetent to testify under canon law, and as
subject to numerous legal and social restrictions based upon sex, were
57
precedents for the later treatment of slaves.

Race and gender both were historical markers of inequality that
were mutually reinforcing, justified through the logic of the dominant
class, and made visible through household organization. Race and gender
54. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 46.
55. Id. at 48.
56. Id. at 18–19. As Reva Siegel has explained regarding the durability of historical household
hierarchy,
Anglo-American common law situated persons in explicitly hierarchical relationships. Thus,
the common law organized the “domestic” relations of husband/wife and master/servant as
relations of governance and dependence, with the law specifying the rights and obligations
of superior and inferior parties. The American common law modeled chattel slavery on this
“domestic” analogue as well.
Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1114 (1997) (quoting Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman’s Stake in
the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 253, 257 (1971)).
57. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 18.
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were, as Ginsburg emphasized, “categories of differentiation” that had
58
been similarly deployed in order to justify unequal treatment.
What the race analogy also stressed was that discriminatory treatment
59
based on either race or gender was both unearned and undeserved. In
60
this “grandmother brief” —the matriarch and progenitor of a string of
briefs that would come after Reed—Ginsburg was “seeking to
demonstrate that in most contexts, to make assumptions about
individuals based on such immutable characteristics was a violation of
61
basic principles of equality and fairness.” Discrimination on the basis of
gender had no grounding in individual behavior and was therefore
injurious because of the lack of correspondence between personal action
62
and earned outcome. Ginsburg highlighted this idea by stating that it
was “impermissible to distinguish on the basis of an unalterable
63
identifying trait over which the individual has no control.” For
Ginsburg, one signal importance of the race-gender analogy was located
in the idea that gender, like race, was not an intrinsic marker of blame or
reward and therefore could not be a factor in creating structures of legal
disadvantage. “Legislative discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes
unrelated to any biological difference between the sexes, ranks with
legislative discrimination based on race, another congenital, unalterable
64
trait of birth, and merits no greater judicial deference.” Determining the
capacity of an individual to be an estate administrator on the basis of sex,
Ginsburg argued, was invalid because “differences between the sexes
65
bear no relationship to the duties performed by an administrator.”
History was not, in fact, destiny, and Ginsburg stated that “however
much some men may wish to preserve Victorian notions about woman’s
relation to man, and the ‘proper’ role of women in society, the law
cannot provide support for obsolete male prejudices or translate them
66
into statutes that enforce sex-based discrimination.”
The Supreme Court agreed. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, found that legitimate state interests in avoiding intrafamily conflict

58. See Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1789, 1798
(2008).
59. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 20.
60. Mayeri, supra note 58, at 1798.
61. Id.
62. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 5–6.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 7. Because gender was like race, gender also deserved to occupy a special status in legal
analysis as a “‘suspect classification’ requiring close judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 5. Invoking the heightened
scrutiny applied to race-based cases, Ginsburg stated that “the Idaho Code, mandating subordination
of women to men without regard to individual capacity, creates a ‘suspect classification’ for which no
compelling justification can be shown.” Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 46.
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and expediting probate court processes by giving preference to men as
administrators did not overcome the need to consider women as
67
mandated by equal protection law. With this holding, the Court signaled
a new judicial understanding of gender and gave voice to the great
possibility that gender-based law reflected historical prejudices rather
than natural capacities. Likewise, the decision signaled that local rules
governing private household economies were subject to constitutional
analysis and intervention, putting states on notice. In the constellation of
cases that Ginsburg and her colleagues argued following Reed, the
Court’s understanding of gender as a historical construct deepened and
68
the Court struck down a panoply of “archaic” laws meant to perpetuate
gender stereotypes about household provisioning and to entrench the
notion of the traditional separate spheres. In the same cases, the Court
also picked up on Ginsburg’s implicit proposition that equal treatment
meant evaluating family members according to their contributions and
earned rights instead of historical household status. In this way, the
Court began to work out a theory of the family absent historical values
and based on the concept of earning.
B. Rejecting “Archaic” Law and Rewarding Work
On the heels of Reed, Ginsburg found a cadre of new cases that, like
Reed, highlighted how outdated assumptions about household
provisioning still animated law. Using tactics similar to those in Reed,
Ginsburg focused on the unequal treatment of men and women who
were similarly situated and strategically took on cases that showcased
men being victimized by the gender presumptions inherent in both state
and federal statutes. Focusing on formal equality enriched by an
antistereotyping principle, as Cary Franklin notes, “Ginsburg pressed the
claims of male plaintiffs in order to promote a new theory of equal
protection founded on an antistereotyping principle. . . . [that] dictated
that the state could not act in ways that reflected or reinforced traditional
69
conceptions of men’s and women’s roles.” Cases like Frontiero v.
70
71
72
Richardson, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, and Califano v. Goldfarb all

67. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). “To give a mandatory preference to members of
either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 76. Justice Burger also went so far as to mention that, although the
Court had not been asked to rule on any question concerning the section that set out the order of
preference for administrators—rather the challenge was to the “modifying appendage” that gave
direction in cases of conflict—the question of gender equity was equally present in that section as well
because of the higher level of preference given to brothers over sisters in the hierarchy. Id. at 77.
68. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975).
69. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law,
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 88 (2010).
70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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targeted statutes based on the logic of coverture—presuming that a wife
had no economic identity apart from her husband—and Ginsburg
litigated these cases to redress the gender inequity embedded in the
statutory allotment of economic benefits. These cases struck at the dying
heart of coverture and effectively eliminated persistent traces of a wife’s
economic disability that still existed in both state and federal statutory
schemes. The cases also did significant work in undoing the gender-based
typecasting that created and perpetuated the notion of separate spheres
for husbands and wives. Women, as Ginsburg argued in her brief for
Reed, could no longer be relegated to a domestic sphere while men
exclusively participated in the sphere of the market and economic
73
earning. In deciding these cases, the Court demonstrated a strong sense
of the need to replace historical understandings of gender roles as
evident in statutory schemes with an updated concept of the family. As
the series of cases unfolded, the Court worked through and began to
articulate just such an updated concept, based on ideas of work, earnings,
and just reward.
1. The Reality of Romantic Paternalism: “Not on a Pedestal, but in a
Cage”
Two years after Reed came Frontiero v. Richardson, a due process
case about the unequal allotment of military benefits to spouses
according to gender and the first case that Ginsburg tried before the
74
Supreme Court. The question at hand was why the military
automatically granted certain benefits to a serviceman with a wife, but
required a servicewoman to prove that her husband was dependent on
75
her for more than one-half of his support. Justice Brennan, writing for
the plurality, came out in strong support of Frontiero’s claim and,
following Ginsburg’s argument from Reed, went to great lengths to
highlight the historical discrimination faced by women. Using and citing
76
a substantial amount of material from Ginsburg’s Reed brief, Brennan
wrote: “There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’

71. 420 U.S. 636.
72. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 25–26.
74. 411 U.S. at 678–79.
75. Id.
76. Justice Brennan cites to Kirsten Amundsen, The Silenced Majority: Women and American
Democracy (1971); Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969);
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1073 (20th anniversary ed. 1962); The President’s Task
Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities, A Matter of Simple Justice (1970); Note, Sex
Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 Harv. L. Rev.
1499, 1507 (1971).
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which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”
Demonstrating a strong responsiveness to the historical argument and
the logic of legal modernization, Justice Brennan remarked on the
changing status of women in American society, saying, “It is true, of
course, that the position of women in America has improved markedly in
recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part
because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face
78
pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination.” Justice
Brennan also observed that institutional change was afoot, adding that
“over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing
79
sensitivity to sex-based classifications.”
Continuing to reason from history, Brennan adopted Ginsburg’s
analogy between gender- and race-based discrimination to highlight the
burden of historical discrimination that women had faced because of
coverture law:
[O]ur statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were
denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal
80
guardians of their own children.

Intent on finding the structural parallels, Justice Brennan may have
elided some of the more subtle and connective parts of Ginsburg’s
81
analogy, failing to recognize the unique history of gender discrimination
82
or the intersectionality between race and gender claims. Nonetheless,
the analogy proved eminently useful in the sense that “it recast practices

77. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685. Justice Brennan observed (as Ginsburg had in both the Frontiero
and Reed briefs) that, while conditions for women were improving, women still constituted a minority
in positions of political and economic power. Id. at 686. Justice Brennan mentioned, pointedly, that
there had never been “a female member of this Court.” Id. at 686 n.17.
78. Id. at 685–86 (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 687.
80. Id. at 685.
81. Reva Siegel has pointed out that “the analogy between race and sex that founds sex
discrimination jurisprudence would seem to be premised on the assumption that there is no
constitutional history of relevance to sex discrimination law.” Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 963 (2002).
Siegel suggests that, while history is a directive principle in Frontiero, there “is no suggestion in
Frontiero, or in subsequent opinions of the Court, that history might help identify the traditional sites
or distinctive forms of discrimination directed against women.” Id. at 962.
82. Serena Mayeri notes, “Although the WRP briefs recounted the interconnections between
struggles for racial justice and women’s rights campaigns, the analogy articulated by Justice Brennan
in the Frontiero plurality opinion was merely comparative rather than connective.” Serena Mayeri, “A
Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective,
110 Yale L.J. 1045, 1075 (2001).
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once viewed as chivalric concessions to women as discrimination worthy
83
of redress.”
Speculating about the presence of “chivalric concessions” in
legislative intent with respect to the differential treatment of male and
female servicemembers, Justice Brennan presumed that the intent
corresponded with the assumption that “the husband in our society is
84
generally the ‘breadwinner’ in the family.” Whereas Reed had
challenged the general notion that a man rather than a woman was better
suited to administering household affairs, Frontiero upended the
underlying assumption that gave substance to the “head of household”
85
theory—breadwinning. Frontiero was, in this way, a radical extension of
Reed because the Frontiero decision questioned the time-honored
assumption that a man was the family breadwinner while his wife was the
86
economic dependent. Contradicting the norms of historical household
provisioning, Frontiero confronted the Court with a modern example of
household ordering in which the wife was the primary breadwinner and
the husband her dependent—in contravention of all the premises of
coverture—and asked why a husband should be disadvantaged solely
87
because he was enacting a nontraditional household status.
Using the dual precedents of Reed and Frontiero, the Court
subsequently proceeded to take on two cases very similar to Frontiero in
that they involved unequal benefits for men and women. The first,
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in 1974 involved the Social Security provision
gamely entitled “Mother’s insurance benefits,” which allowed for
differential allocation of benefits based on whether the earnings were
88
from a deceased husband and father or a deceased wife and mother.
Two years after Wiesenfeld, the Social Security Act was once again at
issue in Califano v. Goldfarb, this time with respect to the Federal Old89
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program. The program
regulated survivor benefits such that benefits based on the earnings of a
deceased husband were payable to the widow without question, while

83. Mayeri, supra note 58, at 1799.
84. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681. Such an assumption, the district court had suggested, would
produce “a considerable saving of administrative expense and manpower.” Id. at 681–82. Justice
Brennan, however, observed that “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency.” Id. at 690 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). And citing subsequently to
Reed, Justice Brennan concluded that “any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the
sexes, [s]olely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . involves the ‘very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution].’” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (citing Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
85. See 411 U.S. at 681.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.1 (1975).
89. 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977).
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benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife were payable to
the widower only if he had been receiving over half of his support from
90
his deceased wife.
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in both cases and in both
decisions he made clear the outdated nature of the legislative
assumptions undergirding the statutes. Justice Brennan pointed out in
Wiesenfeld that the legislative purpose of “Mother’s insurance benefits”
was to protect widowed mothers who, presumably, were not and never
had been a part of the labor market and therefore would require extra
91
support. The opinion stated, however, that this supposition was based
on “an ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalization not tolerated under the
Constitution, namely, that male workers’ earnings are vital to their
families’ support, while female workers’ earnings do not significantly
92
contribute to families’ support.” In Goldfarb, the inherent presumption
93
was identical—that “wives are usually dependent.” Justice Stevens
explained, in a concurrence, that “this discrimination against a group of
males [was] merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of
94
thinking about females.” Both Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan
repeated the phrasing of Wiesenfeld and stated that these presumptions
concerning gender and the traditional roles of provider and dependent
95
were “based on ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations” about gender
roles and the household economy. Ginsburg, writing about Goldfarb,
stated that “the Court thus understood that equations of the kind
embraced in the Social Security Act, lump classifications still riddling
96
federal and state lawbooks, channel and constrain individuals.” In every
one of these of the cases, Ginsburg’s argument for dismantling the
90. Id.
91. 420 U.S. at 648–49.
92. Id. at 636.
93. 430 U.S at 217.
94. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring). Wiesenfeld, besides challenging the idea of the male
breadwinner, also brought up the question of the father as parent and challenged the idea that the
husband would not be available for or interested in taking care of the child was also out of place in this
new family design. 420 U.S. at 651–53.
[The] fact that a man is working while there is a wife at home does not mean that he would,
or should be required to, continue to work if his wife dies. It is no less important for a child
to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female.
Id. at 651–52. Recognizing the dual gender stereotypes at work in the logic of the Act—mothers as
good dependents and fathers as unlikely caretakers—Justice Brennan observed that fathers had
custody and care rights equal to those of mothers and cited to the case of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), which the Court had heard three years earlier with the result of increased due process
rights for widowers with respect to caretaking claims. See Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 227. The synchronicity
between the two cases enabled Wiesenfeld to offer a wide window into the allocation of family roles
and facilitate a deep understanding of the antistereotyping principle, focusing as the case did on
disassembling multiple forms of family stereotypes.
95. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207, 224.
96. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 470.
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historical household model found favor with the Court, gained new
momentum for gender-based claims, and dealt a new blow to the
calcified perimeters of separate spheres.
2. Earned Protection and Dignity for Families
Building on Ginsburg’s argument of earned treatment—that genderbased discrimination was unfair because it failed to recognize the
relationship between behavior and outcome—the cases that followed
Reed also paid great attention, as well as tribute, to the work done by
wives on behalf of their families. Ignoring the connection between
behavior and reward, the Court concluded in Frontiero, was not only
unconstitutional but also contravened an American sense of democracy.
Citing to Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., a case about the
unequal rights of illegitimate children, Justice Brennan observed that
gender-based discrimination violated “the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
97
responsibility.” Gender-based categorizations were constitutionally
unacceptable because the “sex characteristic frequently bears no relation
98
to ability to perform or contribute to society.” The related ideas of
performance for and contribution to both polity and family became an
organizing principle for family and offered a central value for
determining the strength and cohesion of a family.
The Court reiterated this theme from Frontiero and connected
action with outcome in both Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb. Paula Wiesenfeld,
the Court mentioned, had “worked as a teacher for five years before her
marriage, [and] continued teaching after her marriage. Each year she
worked, maximum social security contributions were deducted from her
salary. Paula’s earnings were the couple’s principal source of support
99
during the marriage, being substantially larger than those of appellee.”
Paula Wiesenfeld had put in long hours at work and paid all her social
security tax through her paychecks in order to obtain economic security
100
for the family. To withhold her benefits from her husband upon her
death, the Court plainly stated, was unfair. Such deprivation meant that
Paula Wiesenfeld “not only failed to receive for her family the same
protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received,
but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to
101
contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others.”
The gender stereotyping inherent in the statute was unconstitutional, the

97. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
98. Id.
99. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639.
100. Id. at 645.
101. Id.
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Court observed, but so was the “gender-based differentiation that results
in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes
producing less protection for their families than is produced by the
102
efforts of men.”
Similarly, in Goldfarb, the Court led with the fact that “Mrs.
Hannah Goldfarb worked as a secretary in the New York City public
school system for almost 25 years until her death in 1968. During that
103
entire time she paid in full all social security taxes.” Hannah Goldfarb
was “survived by her husband, Leon Goldfarb . . . a retired federal
employee,” who applied for widower’s benefits and was subsequently
104
denied. Addressing this denial of benefits, the Goldfarb Court cited
extensively and approvingly from Wiesenfeld and reinforced the idea of
105
fair reward for hard work. The Court mentioned at several points in the
opinion that “social security taxes were deducted from Hannah Goldfarb’s
106
salary during the quarter century she worked as a secretary.” As a
worker and a wife, the Court concluded, “Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to
the dignity of knowing that her social security tax would contribute
107
to . . . her husband’s welfare should she predecease him.” Work done
on behalf of the family and to support the family, the Court suggested,
was not to be diminished because of statutory historical hangovers that
apportioned benefits according to gendered assumptions about
108
breadwinning. Work for the family, in this case Hannah Goldfarb’s
work done on behalf of the family, was to be valued.
In deciding this set of cases, the Court not only marked the need for
law to reflect the historical evolution in household norms but also
deployed the earnings argument to equalize entitlements for husbands
and wives. In so doing, the Court also provided a logic that pointed the
way to a new conception of the earned family.

II. From FILIUS NULLIUS to Family Member
While gender-based distinctions were being debated in the Supreme
Court, so too were questions about legitimacy and the rights of
109
nonmarital children. The two conversations were connected. According
to Ginsburg, writing as a scholar, the issues of illegitimacy and gender-

102. Id.
103. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202–03 (1977).
104. Id. at 203.
105. See generally id.
106. Id. at 206.
107. Id. at 204.
108. Id. at 206–07.
109. See Kenneth Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 22 (1977) (“Sex discrimination, discrimination against illegitimate children or their parents,
age discrimination, differential treatment on the basis of wealth—all have been debated . . . .”).
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based discrimination were all part of a litigation strategy meant to
110
challenge “traditional stereotypes,” and the two questions “present[ed]
111
various faces of a single issue: the roles women are to play in society.”
Judging by the frequency with which Supreme Court decisions about
gender and legitimacy referenced one another, it seemed that the Justices
also observed an intimate connection between the two concerns. Marital
benefits cases like Frontiero cited to illegitimacy cases like Weber,
speaking to the idea of earned treatment. In a dissenting opinion in
112
Goldfarb, Justice Rehnquist framed his discussion of constitutional
doctrine and suspect classifications around the analogy between gender113
and legitimacy-based classifications. Advocates like Harry Krause and
Norman Dorsen, working for the ACLU, argued that illegitimacy, like
race and gender, was an immutable characteristic that an individual
acquired not through default in responsibility but through accident of
114
birth. Additionally, illegitimacy, like race and gender, was a trait that
historically had been used to marginalize individuals within the
115
household hierarchy. Even into the 1970s, bastardy laws riddled state
statute books, and the regulation of illegitimacy was “an uncertain
mixture of old English common law tempered with occasional flashes of
116
modern thought.”
Historically, the status of illegitimacy rendered nonmarital children
outsiders within the conventional family, prohibited them from inheriting,
117
and branded them with social opprobrium. Continental law, beginning
in the late medieval period, held illegitimate children to be a social evil

110. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 14 Women’s
Rts. L. Rep. 361, 361 (1992).
111. Id.
112. Justice Rehnquist had a string of dissenting opinions. He dissented in Frontiero, Goldfarb,
Weber, and Trimble. Justice Rehnquist, in his Goldfarb dissent, cited administrative convenience and
benign discrimination as the reasons for his opposition to the majority decision. Typically, Justice
Rehnquist found that there was a rational basis for the discriminatory categories and reiterated that
there was no judicial mandate for heightened scrutiny.
113. Califano, 430 U.S. at 228–42.
114. See Harry D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 62 (1971). For a description of
the collaboration between Krause and Dorsen, as well as the ACLU’s involvement in illegitimacy
litigation, see generally Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 Rutgers
L. Rev. 73 (2003). Davis writes that:
Within the ACLU, challenges to illegitimacy classifications were reserved for the ACLU’s
Juvenile Rights Project, which maintained a high level of activity in attacking illegitimacy
classifications. As Norman Dorsen recalls, the child-based arguments were so compelling
that once they were accepted by the Court in Levy, there seemed to be no pressing reason
to try a different approach.
Id. at 98.
115. Krause, supra note 114, at 2–5.
116. Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 829, 831 (1966).
117. Krause, supra note 114, at 3.
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118

and a moral outrage. Illegitimate children were barred from holding
public office, from appearing in court as a party or witness, and from
119
receiving proper burial. In the common law tradition, illegitimate
children were disabled primarily from an economic standpoint.
Blackstone described the rights and disabilities of the bastard:
The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot
be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs but of his own body; for,
being nullius filius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no
120
ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived.

The illegitimate child had no surname, no home to claim, no
inheritance, and no right to any ancestry. Because of this lack of access to
economic resources and support, illegitimate children were often
121
associated with poverty and the social strife endemic to an underclass.
This stereotype had strong resonance and persisted well into the
twentieth century. “The bastard,” one sociologist wrote in 1939, “like the
prostitute, thief, and beggar . . . is a living symbol of social irregularity, an
122
undeniable evidence of contramoral forces.” Bastardy, as it was named
until almost well into the 1960s, was a mark not just of parental sin but
also of social disorder brought about by household impropriety and
instability. By the late 1960s and 1970s, shifts in norms regarding the
family brought about by social and political upheaval led to a
reexamination of these types of assumptions about household
123
irregularity. New forms of household arrangement were becoming
mainstream, nonmarital households were increasingly common, and the
124
stigma associated with illegitimacy was decreasing accordingly.
Advocates for illegitimate children therefore positioned modern-day
nonmarital children as a class of individuals deserving of new judicial
treatment that reflected these changing family and marital patterns.
In this push for the rights of nonmarital children, the equal
protection doctrine was key, just as it was with the gender-based claims
of discrimination that Ginsburg and her team were making. Advocates
for nonmarital children, such as Norman Dorsen and Harry Krause,
carefully invoked the 1943 Supreme Court decision that proclaimed:
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 1 Blackstone, supra note 5, at 459.
121. Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. Soc. 215, 215–16 (1939).
122. Id. at 215.
123. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2011) (“Societal disapproval of nonmarital
childbearing has also decreased as nonmarital births have become more common.”).
124. See Larry L. Bumpass, What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic
and Institutional Change, 27 Demography 483, 488–90 (1990).
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upon the doctrine of equality.” That ancestry did not create legal
destiny was a foundational claim for the class of nonmarital children.
Rewriting roles within the family such that flawed ancestry or inferior
household status were not controlling factors was the lodestar of those
advocating for the rights of women and nonmarital children. As
Ginsburg and her colleagues brought to light, the two classes of
individuals were bound together through ties of historic discrimination
based on household status and “archaic” stereotypes about the family.
Levy v. Louisiana was the first step in redeeming the rights of these
nonmarital children and overturning another set of statutes that operated
on the assumptions of historical heritage rather than earned reward.
A. LEVY V. LOUISIANA: Opening the Door for Nonmarital Children
Writing for the Court in Levy, Justice Douglas began with a simple
proposition: “We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not
‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being. They are
clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of
126
the Fourteenth Amendment.” With that statement, the Court signaled
a significant adjustment to the historical positioning of illegitimate
children with respect to inheritance rights by allowing that illegitimate
children were, in fact, a class of persons with rights, claims, and
protections. Levy gave nonmarital children the right to recover for the
wrongful death of their mother and marked the beginning of a momentous
string of cases that fundamentally modified the rights available to
127
children born outside of the conventional marital household. Levy also
125. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Sherrie Anne Bakelar, From “Baggage”
to Not “Non-persons”: Levy v. Louisiana and the Struggle for Equal Rights for “Illegitimate”
Children 150–52 (Dec. 1, 2010) (unpublished master thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas), available at
http://digitalcommons.library.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/746. Writing a dissent in Labine v. Vincent,
Justice Brennan also cited this line from the Hirabayashi decision. 401 U.S. 532, 558 (1971) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
126. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
127. The ACLU and its affiliates had litigated cases that implicated the rights of individuals not
embedded in and protected by traditional family relationships earlier in the 1960s as part of a larger
civil rights and antipoverty agenda, winning cases such as King v. Smith, in which the “man of the
house” rule was invalidated and the Court held that aid for dependent children could not be withheld
because of a mother’s involvement with a “substitute father.” 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968). With Levy,
however, the focus shifted from combating poverty to creating equal protection for all household
members—especially nonmarital children. It was therefore unclear whether or not fundamental rights
were at stake. As John Gray and David Rudovsky—two lawyers who helped prepare the Levy brief—
wrote:
The Court’s characterization of the rights involved is of no small significance. If the right to
wrongful death recovery is to be considered “basic” in our constitutional scheme, other
economic relationships which similarly can be said to involve “intimate, familial
relationships” would also seem to be deserving of special constitutional protections.
John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1969). From this
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foregrounded the themes that would appear time and time again in the
nonmarital children cases—lifting the penalty for illegitimacy from the
nonmarital child and recognizing the natural, if informal, relationship
that existed between a mother and her nonmarital child.
The Levy family’s situation was, as one historian suggests, “a sad
128
one.” After feeling unwell for a number of days, Louise Levy was
admitted to a local hospital and, due to a series of mistaken diagnoses
129
and negligent care, died there little more than two weeks later. At the
time of her death, Levy was mother to and caretaker of five nonmarital
130
children. Bereft of economic support when their mother died, the five
131
children sued for the right to recover under a Louisiana statute. The
district court in Louisiana initially dismissed the case, and the court of
appeals upheld the district court’s decision on the grounds that the state
had a legitimate interest in discouraging couples from having children
132
outside of marriage. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to grant
certiorari, and the “Levy children’s cause languished until the fall of 1967
when [their lawyer] approached Norman Dorsen about the case and the
133
possibility of arguing it before the U.S. Supreme Court.”
Dorsen, a New York University Law School professor and an
ACLU colleague of Ginsburg’s, agreed to take the case and, by the
134
spring of 1968, it came before the Supreme Court. At issue, according
to Dorsen, was not just the historical discrimination that disadvantaged a
class of children but also the fact that these nonmarital children had no
135
agency or control over their status as illegitimate. Speaking to the
perspective, they continued, “Levy may be read to support the emergence of preferred social and
economic rights.” Id. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., decided same year,
extended rights to the mother of an illegitimate child, allowing her to recover for her child’s wrongful
death. 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968).
128. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 3.
129. Id. at 3–4.
130. Id. at 4.
131. The children asked both for damages based on the loss of their mother as well as damages
based on the survival of a cause of action that the mother had at the time of her death for pain and
suffering. Levy, 391 U.S. at 69–70.
132. Id. at 70.
133. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 7.
134. Id. at 7–8.
135. Id. at 3, 9–10. While Dorsen could also have chosen to focus on the race of the Levy children,
he “did not construct his winning argument around the fact that the Levy children were AfricanAmerican” and preferred to focus on birth status alone. Id. at 3. In this way, “Dorsen’s argument
became universal, divorcing the status of illegitimate from that of race and rendering immaterial the
fact that the Levy children were African-American.” Id. Despite Dorsen’s choice to highlight birth
status instead of race, a strong link—demographically and imaginatively—existed between AfricanAmerican families and illegitimacy. See Evelyn M. Kitagawa, New Life-Styles: Marriage Patterns,
Living Arrangements, and Fertility Outside of Marriage, 453 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 1, 8–
10 (1981). Racialized discourse about African-American families—and the breakdown of these
families—was abundant. For a famous example, see the Moynihan Report, which noted the problems
of race and class in family formation and stability. Off. of Pol’y Planning & Research, U.S. Dep’t of
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outdated nature of discrimination against illegitimate children, Justice
Douglas stated in his concurrence in King v. Smith (decided in the same
year as Levy): “This penalizing the children for the sins of their mother is
reminiscent of the archaic corruption of the blood, a form of bill of
136
attainder.” The same sentiment applied to the Levy’s children inability
to recover for their mother’s wrongful death. Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court in Levy, posited the rhetorical question: “[W]hy, in terms of
‘equal protection,’ should the tortfeasors go free merely because the
137
The discrimination suffered by nonmarital
child is illegitimate?”
138
children was both outdated and unfair.
The Levy children were not to blame for the failure of their parents
to become legally bound in marriage; they had caused no harm and had
violated no laws. The fact of their existence violated a social norm—
albeit a changing one—but penalizing the children for their birth
allocated blame to the wrong parties, the Court observed. As
contributing and upstanding citizens, the Levy children were being
unfairly denied rights and remedies. The Levy children, the Court
suggested, merited equal citizenship if only because they were “subject to
all the responsibilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and
139
conscription under the Selective Service Act.” Reasoning in this way, it
140
was “invidious to discriminate” against the Levy children when “no
action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs [was] possibly relevant to the
141
harm that was done the mother.” This idea of indexing treatment to
behavior was a motif that appeared repeatedly in the cases that followed,
as the Court continued to develop the idea of the distribution of familybased rights according to earned penalty or reward.
If earned treatment was one motif, a second motif that Justice
Douglas wove through the opinion was that of the natural affection
between a mother and her child. This maternal affection was so strong
142
that it did not diminish even in the absence of a formal family structure.
As Justice Douglas observed with respect to the Levy children, “[t]he
rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a

Labor, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action 5 (1965) (“The white family has achieved
a high degree of stability and is maintaining that stability. By contrast, the family structure of lower
class Negroes is highly unstable, and in many urban centers is approaching complete breakdown.”).
136. 392 U.S. 309, 336 n.5 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
137. 391 U.S. at 71.
138. Id. Citing King Lear, Justice Douglas brought poetry to the cause, proclaiming, “We can say
with Shakespeare: ‘Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well compact, My mind
as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us With base? with
baseness? bastardy? base, base?’” Id. at 72 n.6 (quoting William Shakespeare, King Lear act 2, sc. 2).
139. Id. at 71.
140. Id. at 72.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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child and his own mother.” The relationship, he continued, was a
unique and natural one that did not change according to the mother’s
marital status: “Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children,
though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and
nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the
144
spiritual sense.”
Responsive to this unique relationship, the Court honed in on the
fact that Louise Levy had loved her children and raised them with strong
moral values. Louise Levy had “treated them as a parent would treat any
145
146
other child” and worked steadily as a “domestic servant” in order to
be able to provide for the children. In addition, Louise Levy had sent her
147
children to parochial school and gone to church with them on Sundays.
Reviewing Louise Levy’s behavior toward her children, the Court easily
and with no dissent confirmed the position put forward by the Levy
children’s counsel that “the mothers of illegitimate children were just as
148
central to a child’s life as the mothers of legitimate children.” In this
way, the Court deconstructed the barrier between the marital and
nonmarital family—at least as defined by the mother and child—adding
further justification to ending the differential treatment of marital and
149
nonmarital children.
With Levy, then, the Court took a fundamental first step by bringing
the nonmarital children into the family fold and making available to
them the same legal remedies available to marital children. Nonmarital
children were no longer strictly confined to a lower rung on the
hierarchical ladder of the historical household and Levy thus “laid the
groundwork for a series of cases that continued to expand legal
protection for nonmarital children, including access to welfare benefits,
150
and paternal visitation rights and financial support.” As the Levy

143. Id. at 71.
144. Id. at 72.
145. Id. at 70.
146. Id. The Court’s portrayal of Louise Levy was also laden with racial stereotypes. The Court, in
describing Louise Levy, implicitly evoked the stereotype of a “Mammy” whose “primary role was
domestic service, characterized by long hours of work with little or no financial compensation.
Subordination, nurturance, and constant self-sacrifice were expected.” Carolyn M. West, Mammy,
Sapphire, and Jezebel: Historical Images of Black Women and Their Implications for Psychotherapy,
32 Psychotherapy: Theory, Res., Prac., Training 458, 459 (1995).
147. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
148. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 5.
149. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 27, at 1255. Citing to Levy, Ristroph and Murray mention
that “[i]n constitutional and state law alike, several efforts have been made to update the legal
understanding of the family to reflect the increasing diversity of family life” but argue that legal
protection is available only when the informal family acts as though it were a formal one. Id. at 1256.
150. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 11. See generally Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986); Pickett v.
Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
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decision also made clear, future determinations about the rights of
nonmarital children would be based on the concepts of earned treatment
and the validity of certain informal family arrangements.
B. Flawed Incentive Structures and the Psychology of the
Natural Family
Like Reed, Levy was important because of the ruling and the
precedential support it provided. Levy did not provide a roadmap for all
questions—the level of scrutiny to be applied by the Court was still
unclear and, as Harry Krause pointed out: “Since the common law curse
of filius nullius still affects the relationship between the illegitimate and
his father, the interesting question about the Levy case is whether it will
151
be extended to the father-child relationship.” The Court continued to
waver on the question of scrutiny for two decades after Levy, but the
question of the father-child relationship was answered by the case that
followed Levy. The father-child relationship, which was addressed
mainly in the context of the nonmarital child’s right to recover or to
claim support, was relatively simple because the “illegitimate’s claim
against his father does not rest on an analogy to his claim against his
mother. Rather, it rests on comparison with the legitimate child’s rights
152
against his father.” Determinations about the fitness and character of
unwed fathers were put aside for hearing in other contexts. To the
benefit of nonmarital children, the Court focused on dismantling the
structural stigma that subordinated nonmarital children to their marital
counterparts.
1. “Illogical and Unjust”: Transforming the Logic of Illegitimacy
The next big case—and the case that answered the question about the
father-child relationship—was Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. in
153
1972. Weber determined that Louisiana workmen’s compensation laws
that disallowed dependent unacknowledged, illegitimate children from
recovering on an equal footing with dependent legitimate children
154
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Writing for the plurality in

(1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Glona v. Am. Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
151. Harry D. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana—First Decisions
on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 338, 339 (1969).
152. Id. at 340–41.
153. 406 U.S. at 164.
154. Id. at 165. In 1967, when Henry Clyde Stokes died from work-related injuries, he had been
living with Willie Mae Weber, the mother of his two illegitimate children. Id. Stokes’ four legitimate
children also lived with Stokes and Weber because Stokes’ legal wife had been committed to a mental
hospital. Id. Stokes’ four legitimate children filed a claim for their father’s death under Louisiana’s
workmen’s compensation law. Id. at 165–66. Subsequently, Stokes’ employer impleaded Willie Mae
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Weber, Justice Powell followed the path cleared by Levy and invoked the
interrelated logics of penalty and disability in order to reject the
155
historical status of the illegitimate child. Speaking to the historical
household position of and discrimination against illegitimate children,
Justice Powell evoked democratic and meritocratic values to sustain the
force of the Court’s holding, penning sentences that were cited freely and
frequently in the cases after Weber:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
156
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.

At a minimum, Justice Powell and his colleagues observed, disability had
to be tied to damaging behavior, and punishment as well as reward had
to be earned.
This logic of earned outcome and individual responsibility was so
strong, the Court observed, that it trumped a state’s interest in
encouraging marriage and the state’s right to determine the optimal form
157
for family operations. Previous to Weber coming before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that the State of
Louisiana had an important interest in encouraging the formation of
158
legitimate, formal families. While not denying this state interest in
encouraging marriage, Justice Powell and his colleagues doubted that
penalizing illegitimate offspring helped attain that end: “Nor can it be
thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring
159
may not one day reap the benefits of workmen’s compensation.” The
State did have an interest in setting up an incentive structure that
promoted marriage, the Court allowed, but not if the incentive structure
160
penalized the wrong party—the illegitimate children.

Weber, who appeared and claimed compensation benefits for the two illegitimate children. Id. at 166.
While this suit was working its way through the system, the four legitimate children received a
settlement that exceeded the benefits allowable under workmen’s compensation for a tort claim
against a third party. Id. The illegitimate children did not share in that settlement and when the four
legitimate children dismissed the workmen’s compensation claim because the settlement had provided
them with the maximum allowable amount of compensation, the illegitimate children were left with
nothing. Id.
155. Id. at 171–72.
156. Id. at 175.
157. “The judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating constitutional rights without
interfering unduly with the State’s primary responsibility in this area.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 771 (1977).
158. 406 U.S. at 173.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 175.
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The Court deployed identical logic in Trimble v. Gordon when it
addressed legitimacy-based discrimination embedded in intestacy default
161
rules. In that case, the relevant part of the Illinois Probate Act provided
at the time that illegitimate children could inherit by intestate succession
only from their mothers, even though under Illinois law legitimate children
were able to inherit by intestate succession from both their mothers and
162
their fathers. As the state court had in Weber, the Illinois Supreme Court
in Trimble upheld the constitutionality of the discriminatory provision
because it supported “state interests in encouraging family
163
relationships.” Taking up this point in the U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Justice Powell began by asserting, “No one disputes the appropriateness of
Illinois’ concern with the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social
164
institution of our society.” However, he continued, citing to Weber, “no
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
165
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.” Justice
Powell added that “parents have the ability to conform their conduct to
societal norms, but their illegitimate children can affect neither their
166
parents’ conduct nor their own status.” One year after Weber, in Gomez
v. Perez, the Court articulated the crux of the issue even more clearly,
stating that there was “no constitutionally sufficient justification for
denying such an essential right to [support] a child simply because its
167
natural father has not married its mother.”
Rejecting the idea of visiting punishment for the parents on the
children, the Court also rejected the idea that bonds of affection and

161. 430 U.S. at 763–64. The Court had addressed intestacy law with respect to illegitimate
children in 1971 with Labine v. Vincent, with no finding of discrimination. 401 U.S. 532, 533 (1971).
Deta Mona Trimble was the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon and had
lived with both of her parents until her father’s death by homicide in 1974. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 763–
64. The year before Gordon’s death, an Illinois circuit court had entered a paternity order finding
Gordon to be Deta Mona’s father and had ordered Gordon to pay weekly support. Id. at 764. Gordon
had also openly acknowledged Deta Mona as his daughter. Id. When Gordon died, Deta Mona’s
mother filed a petition for determination of heirship, from which Deta Mona was excluded by the
court. Id.
162. Id. at 764–65 (“An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of
any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an
illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would
have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged
by the father as the father’s child is legitimate.” (quoting 3 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 12 (1973))).
163. Id. at 766.
164. Id. at 769.
165. Id. at 770 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175). This same phrase was also cited by the Court a
decade later in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (per
curiam).
166. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770.
167. 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). The Court recognized “lurking problems with respect
to proof of paternity. Those problems are not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be made
into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.” Id.

Tait_63-HLJ-1365 (Do Not Delete)

1374

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/24/2012 8:25 PM

[Vol. 63:1345

affinity (as well as those of economic dependence) did not connect an
informal family in the same way they did a formal family. When Weber
had come before the Louisiana Supreme Court, that court had suggested
that illegitimate children were not within the scope of a family’s concern
168
in the way legitimate children were. Addressing this argument, Justice
Powell observed, “The illegitimate, so this argument runs, may thus be
made less eligible for the statutory recoveries and inheritances reserved
for those more likely to be within the ambit of familial care and
169
affection.” Rejecting assumptions about the place of illegitimate
children in the traditional family, Justice Powell stated that “the
dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegitimate
children for their father were as great as those of the four legitimate
children . . . . The legitimate children and the illegitimate children all
lived in the home of the deceased and were equally dependent upon him
170
for maintenance and support.” In this way, the Court acknowledged
that an informal family could operate in substantially the same way as a
formal family and effectively erased the boundary line that had kept
illegitimate children from benefiting from family membership. What
made the informal family look a great deal like the formal one was the
economic interdependence of its members and the investment that each
family member made toward the unit, whether economic or affective.
2. The Physical and Emotional Toll of Being an Unwed Mother
Another way in which the Supreme Court enlarged protections
available to nonmarital children was by invalidating statute of limitation
laws in many states that prematurely foreclosed the nonmarital child or
the child’s mother from seeking support from an absent father.
Invalidating these statutes of limitation served the same purpose of
putting nonmarital children on the same economic footing as marital
children. In all of these cases, the Court gave additional attention to the
status of the unwed mother and her psychology, further validating the
natural link between the unwed mother and her nonmarital child.
Without passing judgment on the question of parental fitness or making
any comparison between mothers and fathers, these cases all assumed a
caretaker mother and an absent father, subsequently focusing on the
right of the illegitimate child to seek support from the father.
171
The first of these cases was Mills v. Habluetzel. Mills came in
172
response to Gomez, after which Texas had established a procedure for

168. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171 (1972).
169. Id. at 173.
170. Id. at 169–70.
171. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
172. In 1973, the Court expanded the rights of illegitimate children to claim support from
biological, but not legal, fathers. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). The case of
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173

nonmarital children seeking paternal support. The statutory provision
required that the nonmarital child come forward with proof of paternity
in order to establish a claim for support before the child’s first birthday,
174
and failing that the suit was barred. The result was “a one-year window
in its previously ‘impenetrable barrier,’ through which an illegitimate
175
child may establish paternity and obtain paternal support.” The Court
176
found this window inadequate. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her
concurrence to Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, there were many
practical as well as psychological reasons for extending the right beyond
177
one year. A mother who was receiving child support might be unlikely
to jeopardize the support by filing a paternity suit in order to protect her
178
child’s right. In addition, the mother’s reluctance to file a paternity suit
could stem, Justice O’Connor suggested, “from the emotional strain of
having an illegitimate child, or even from the desire to avoid community
and family disapproval [and] may continue years after the child is
179
born.”
As Justice O’Connor observed: “The problem may be
180
exacerbated if, as often happens, the mother herself is a minor.” The
one-year rule penalized nonmarital children for what could be an
unending set of complicated family circumstances and effectively barred
the child from receiving support except in the most limited of
181
circumstances.

Gomez arose in Texas, where the statutory scheme regulating child support required a father to
support his legitimate children, both during a marriage and after divorce as well, and considered the
failure to do so as subject to criminal sanction. Id. at 536. When Gomez came before the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals, that court had held:
[N]owhere in this elaborate statutory scheme does the State recognize any enforceable duty
on the part of the biological father to support his illegitimate children and that, absent a
statutory duty to support, the controlling law is the Texas common-law rule that illegitimate
children, unlike legitimate children, have no legal right to support from their fathers.
Id. at 536–37.
173. The Texas legislature created chapter 13 of the Texas Code to govern the rights of nonmarital
children and to operate “in conjunction with other provisions of the Code to establish the duty of
fathers to support their illegitimate children.” Mills, 456 U.S. at 94.
174. Id. at 95.
175. Id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed: “Although it granted illegitimate
children the opportunity to obtain support by establishing paternity, Texas was less than generous.”
Id. at 94.
176. Id. at 101.
177. Id. at 105 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 100 (majority opinion).
179. Id. at 105 n.4 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
180. Id.
181. Although the Court did not determine what would be an appropriate length of time for this
type of statute of limitations, the Justices agreed that there were two criteria that needed to be taken
into account:
First, the period for obtaining support . . . must be sufficiently long in duration to present a
reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their
behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related
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One year after Mills, the Court addressed the same question in the
context of a two-year limitation on certain illegitimate children in
Tennessee. In Pickett v Brown, Tennessee law held a father responsible
for the support of his nonmarital child upon establishment of paternity,
182
and the limit for filing any paternity and support action was two years.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in addressing the issue, had found the
two-year timeframe adequate to allow “for most women to have
recovered physically and emotionally, and to be able to assess their and
183
their children’s situations logically and realistically.” The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, was not convinced and observed that “[p]roblems
stemming from a mother’s emotional well-being are of particular concern
in assessing the validity of Tennessee’s limitations period because [the
statute] permits suit to be filed only by the mother or by her personal
184
representative if the child is not likely to become a public charge.” The
Texas statute in question in Mills, the Court mentioned, had allowed
185
anyone connected with the child to bring suit. Leveraging Justice
O’Connor’s argument from her concurrence in Mills, Brennan delivered
the unanimous opinion for the Pickett Court and observed that most of
the problems created by a one-year limitation continued to exist with a
186
two-year limitation.
Neither Mills nor Pickett suggested what time limitations might be
187
acceptable, leaving the door open for Clark v. Jeter in 1988. Relying
heavily on the precedent of both Mills and Pickett, Justice O’Connor,
writing for the Court, stated that even a six-year limitation ran afoul of
188
the Equal Protection Clause. Addressing Pennsylvania’s six-year rule,
Justice O’Connor wrote:

to the State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Id. at 99–100 (majority opinion). Vectors of race and class were also present in these discussions, given
the predominance of illegitimacy in low-income African-American families, and questions of welfare
entitlements and alternative social norms both came into play. These questions of race and class
emerged in procedural question that came before the Court as well. Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), and Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), both raised questions about the
ability of low-income parents to pay for legal necessaries, such as representation of required testing.
For more information about the intersection between race, class, and illegitimacy, see supra note 135.
182. 462 U.S. 1, 1–2. Exceptions existed if the father had already provided support to the child or
had acknowledged paternity in writing, or if the child was in danger of becoming a “public charge, in
which case the State or any person [could] bring suit at any time prior to the child’s 18th birthday.” Id.
at 1.
183. Id. at 6 (quoting Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369, 379 (1982)).
184. Id. at 13. n.12.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 13–14.
187. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
188. Id. at 463 (“In light of this authority, we conclude that Pennsylvania’s 6-year statute of
limitations violates the Equal Protection Clause. Even six years does not necessarily provide a
reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child.”).
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Even six years does not necessarily provide a reasonable opportunity
to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child. . . . Not all of these
difficulties are likely to abate in six years. A mother might realize only
belatedly “a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the
child.” Furthermore, financial difficulties are likely to increase as the
child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical
189
care.

Again, the Court exhibited great sensitivity to the unwed mother’s
psychological state as she decided when and how to make a claim for
child support. Bolstering the protection extended in these cases, the
Court also articulated the intermediate scrutiny standard as applied to
this class for the first time since extending equal protection to nonmarital
190
children in Levy. Discrimination based on historical household status
was no longer acceptable in the context of nonmarital children;
nonmarital children had a fundamental right to equal as well as earned
treatment, and the informal family of mother and child gained important
validation.

III. Equal Parenting and the Case of the Unwed Father
A third case that came before the Court at the same time as Reed
and just after Levy was Stanley v. Illinois, another in this grouping of
family-centered cases that effectuated new levels of household
191
equalization and role reordering. Stanley used equal protection claims,
like Reed and Levy, but this time to bring the rights of unwed fathers into
192
balance with those of other parents. Like illegitimate children, unwed
fathers historically were presumed to operate outside the bounds of the
193
conventional household. The principle of filius nullius ran both ways—
the illegitimate child had no claim to parentage and the putative father
had no rights or responsibilities with respect to a child conceived out of
wedlock. “Unwed biological fathers had no right to commence paternity
actions under the common law. Moreover, the common law established

189. Id. at 463–64 (citation omitted) (quoting Pickett, 462 U.S. at 12).
190. Id. at 461. Justice O’Connor wrote:
Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of
intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications
based on sex or illegitimacy.
To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially
related to an important governmental objective. Consequently we have invalidated
classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations
of their parents, because “visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
191. 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
192. Id.
193. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 637,
644 (1993).
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an irrebuttable presumption that a mother’s husband was the father of
194
her children.”
If a custody dispute between unwed parents did happen to arise, the
195
presumption favored the unwed mother. Determination of paternity
was significantly more difficult than was establishing maternity, and the
possibility of fraudulent claims made courts wary of decreeing paternity
without ample evidence. The recognition of the unique relationship
between mother and child also militated for maternal custody:
This common law recognition of a mother’s exclusive, primary right
to the custody of her illegitimate child arose from the presumption that
the mother was a better custodian than the putative father. The
presumption was based upon . . . the strength of the bonds of love and
196
affection assumed to exist between mother and child.

One scholar named this system of custody of and care for
illegitimate children, in which fathers were stripped of parental identity
197
and all control was given to the mother, “male coverture.” Male
coverture, a mirror image of traditional coverture and a system of
regulating the informal household, vested substantive control over and
full economic responsibility for the nonmarital child in the mother—
making her the “head of the household” in the nonmarital family. “In
198
effect, in non-marital families, men [were] ‘covered’ by women.”
Another family law scholar described the different rights accorded
to and assumptions made about unwed mothers and fathers by observing
that “since the nineteenth century, claims to maternity have invoked
199
nature; claims to paternity have invoked culture.” Stated another way,
claims to and discussions of parenting historically invoked nature to
explain the affection and connection felt between a parent and child, and
these natural analyses typically worked to the benefit of the mother and

194. Id. (footnotes omitted).
195. Id.
196. Comment, Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers’ Rights: A Psychological
Parenthood Perspective, 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 290, 295 (1985) (footnote omitted).
197. Davis, supra note 114, at 73. For a chart that details the gendered role reversal that occurred
between the formal and informal family within the system of coverture, see Kristin Collins, Note,
When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright,
109 Yale L.J. 1669, 1683 (2000). For more on the gendered assumptions underlying laws regulating
custody and care, see Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 Hastings L.J. 557,
561–65 (2000).
198. Davis, supra note 114, at 81–82. Despite the fact that the unwed mother held all responsibility
for her illegitimate child and the unwed father held none, the mother was still unable to legitimate the
child on her own. “A non-married woman can never give birth to an illegitimate child in accordance
with the legitimation principle, while a non-married man can render that birth legitimate.” Martha T.
Zingo & Kevin E. Early, Nameless Persons: Legal Discrimination Against Non-Marital
Children in the United States 33 (1994). In this way, while the broad contours of coverture may be
reversed with nonmarital families, “patriarchal and paternalistic values” persist. Id.
199. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 646.
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detriment of the father. Arguments from “nature,” as the illegitimacy
cases demonstrated, supported the presence of a unique and
irreplaceable bond between mother and child; these same arguments
implied the lack of natural connection between a father and his child.
Paternity invoked culture because it had no purchase in nature. As
Ginsburg remarked, discussing Stanley, the “stereotypical notion . . . is
evident: all women, wed or unwed, want their children and by nature are
fit custodians; a man’s parental devotion, however, does not extend to
200
the offspring of an out-of-wedlock union.” Stanley successfully
challenged this notion that paternity had no basis in natural feeling or
connection; however, the string of cases involving the rights of unwed
fathers that came after Stanley did not meet with the same success. The
decisions in those subsequent cases both cast doubt on the parenting of
unwed fathers and reaffirmed the idea that the failure of the unwed
father to be attached to a family unit indicated a deeper failure as a
parent. The blame that was lifted from the heads of illegitimate children
came to rest on the heads of the unwed father, penalty finally finding a
safe haven.
A. STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: Hearing Rights and Parenting Presumptions
The facts of Stanley, no less than those in Reed and Levy, hinted at
the moving story of a family being torn apart by the untimely death of
one of its members. Likewise, Stanley offered a story about individual
family members being forced to bring legal claims in order to vindicate
belonging to and participation in the family. In the case of Stanley, Joan
and Peter Stanley had lived together off and on for eighteen years,
201
during which time they had and raised three children. Peter and Joan
had never married, and when Joan died “Peter Stanley lost not only her
but also his children” because of an Illinois statute providing that the
children of unwed fathers became wards of the State upon the death of
202
the mother. Stanley claimed that he should have at least been allowed a
hearing and that, “since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be
deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived
203
of the equal protection of the laws.”
The State of Illinois argued that it was unnecessary to hold these
types of individualized hearings because “unwed fathers [were] presumed
204
unfit to raise their children.” As the State declared in its brief, “in most

200. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1975).
201. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1971).
202. Id.
203. Id. Illinois did, at the time, accord hearings to any parents but defined parents as “the father
and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child,
and . . . any adoptive parent.” Id. at 650 (citing 37 Ill. Rev. Stat. § 701-14 (1973)).
204. Id. at 647.
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instances, the natural father is a stranger to his children.” The argument
continued: “While a legitimate child usually is raised by both parents
with the attendant familial relationships and a firm concept of home and
identity, the illegitimate child normally knows only one parent—the
206
mother.” The Supreme Court agreed in thinking that the presumption
against unwed fathers had reasonable basis. “It may be,” the Court
acknowledged, “that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and
neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a parent and that
207
his children should be placed in other hands.” The Court, however, was
not ready to make a blanket assumption about the parenting capacities
of unwed fathers, stating that “all unmarried fathers are not in this
208
category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.”
Avoiding judgment on whether or not Peter Stanley fell into the
category of unsuitable and neglectful parents, the Court determined
instead that “integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the right in
209
question—to preserve and maintain a family—was a fundamental right.
Even the absence of legal marriage could not obviate the fundamental
nature of the right. Referring to Levy, Justice White observed that
illegitimate “children cannot be denied the right of other children
because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and
important as those arising within a more formally organized family
210
unit.” If the Levy children could not be denied the right to family bonds
because of the informal family organization, then neither could Peter
Stanley be denied the right to be heard when the very constitution—or as
211
212
the Court put it, the “dismemberment” —of his family was at stake.
Just as important as the plurality opinion, however, may have been
Justice Burger’s dissent, which set forth an argument that hewed closely
to the State of Illinois’s logic and made damaging allegations about
unwed fathers. Repeating and reifying received wisdom about unwed
fathers, Justice Burger stated:

205. Id. at 654 n.6.
206. Id. at 653 n.5. According to this theory, the best interest of the child dictated that unwed
fathers be omitted from consideration in questions of legal parentage and the statute fulfilled “the
compelling governmental objective of protecting children.” Id. at 654 n.5.
207. Id. at 654.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 651.
210. Id. at 652.
211. Id. at 658.
212. On a practical note, the Court added that if Illinois’s contention were true and few unwed
fathers would seek custody, then the policy of granting a hearing to these fathers would not
overburden courts. “If unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children,
they will not appear to demand hearings.” Id. at 654 n.9.
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I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of
common human experience, that the biological role of the mother in
carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between her and
the child than the bonds resulting from the male’s often casual
encounter. This view is reinforced by the observable fact that most
unwed mothers exhibit a concern for their offspring either permanently
or at least until they are safely placed for adoption, while unwed
fathers rarely burden either the mother or the child with their
attentions or loyalties. Centuries of human experience buttress this
view of the realities of human conditions and suggest that unwed
mothers of illegitimate children are generally more dependable
213
protectors of their children than are unwed fathers.

Breaching the boundary line set by the plurality opinion, Justice
Burger continued his analysis by making a foray into Peter Stanley’s
claim to be a good father. “Stanley depicts himself as a somewhat
unusual unwed father, namely, as one who has always acknowledged and
never doubted his fatherhood of these children. He alleges that he loved,
cared for, and supported these children from the time of their birth until
214
the death of their mother.” Justice Burger’s observations led him to a
different conclusion. After the death of his wife, Justice Burger noted,
Stanley had turned the children over to “the care of a Mr. and Mrs.
Ness” and had taken no action to gain guardianship until the case came
215
to the attention of the State through other channels. Even under threat
of State action, Justice Burger suggested, Peter Stanley “seemed, in
particular, to be concerned with the loss of the welfare payments he
would suffer as a result of the designation of others as guardians of the
216
children.” Peter Stanley was not, from the perspective of the dissent, a
parent deserving of legal protection; rather than a bereaved husband and
father, Stanley was instead a self-interested actor.
This gender typecasting paired with the severe reading of Stanley’s
parenting attempts provided an influential model of interpretation in the
cases that came after Stanley. The majority’s agnosticism on the matter of
Stanley’s parenting—coupled with Justice Burger’s dismissive analysis of
it—preserved significant ground for skepticism about the natural
parenting capabilities of the unwed father. Subsequently, even if Stanley
was “the most important father’s rights decision in the United States
217
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the case nonetheless left the door
open for future stereotyping of unwed fathers and gave grounds for

213. Id. at 665–66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Exceptions existed, Justice Burger allowed, but they
were few and far between enough that the statute still served the purpose of providing for the best
interest of the child and fulfilling “the State’s obligations as parens patriae.” Id. at 666.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 667.
216. Id.
217. Tiffany Salayer, Rights of Parents: Stanley v. Illinois, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 249, 249
(2004).
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judicial reluctance to fully equalize unwed fathers with other parents.
Speaking to the Court’s failure to support the full rights of Peter Stanley,
Ginsburg noted in an article of hers at the time, the “Court did not hold,
as Stanley invited it to, that unwed fathers stand even with mothers and
218
wed fathers when child custody is the issue.”
B. Preference for the “Family Unit” and One-Sided Stories
After Stanley was decided, a string of cases in the late 1970s and
early 1980s came before the Court with questions pertaining to adoption
rules and procedures in the context of unwed fathers, obtaining mixed
results. Because the Court in Stanley did not provide a blueprint for
“how future courts would interpret the significance of the finding that
219
the Stanleys were a ‘family,’” cases following Stanley were not predetermined by a strong precedent, the way that cases in the wake of Reed
and Levy were. In most cases, diverging from Stanley’s agnostic stance
toward the parental capability of unwed fathers, the Court denied
putative fathers their adoption rights and determined that biology was
insufficient grounds for paternal rights. No discussion of historical
discrimination or unconstitutional gender typecasting was present in
these adoption cases. The Court focused instead on natural family
connections—connections between parents and children as well as
between the mothers and fathers themselves—using a framework that
prioritized the nuclear, whether formal or informal. In addition to
reasoning based on natural connections, the idea of earned treatment
was present in these cases. However, it worked against unwed fathers
who generally were construed by the Court to have failed to earn the
right to participate in the family as a parent. In this sense, the Court took
a page from Justice Burger’s dissent rather than the Stanley plurality
opinion by passing judgment on the quality of the family interaction and
not the structural inequities of adoption statutes.
1. Putative Fathers and the Importance of Being Married
The first adoption rights case to come before the Court after Stanley
220
was Quilloin v. Walcott in 1978. Quilloin involved the constitutionality
of Georgia’s adoption law denying an unwed father “authority to prevent
221
the adoption of his illegitimate child.” Five years after Quilloin, the

218. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 459.
219. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 651 (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
220. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). Leon Webster Quilloin and Ardell Williams had a child out of wedlock in
1964 and separated not long after. Id. at 247. Three years later, Williams married Randall Walcott, and
nine years after that, she consented to the adoption of the child by her husband. Id. Quilloin attempted
to block the adoption and to secure visitation rights, but the court granted Walcott’s adoption of the
child over Quilloin’s objection. Id.
221. Id.
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case of Lehr v. Robertson brought up questions surrounding notice of
222
adoption to unwed fathers and the utility of the putative father registry.
Both cases involved a putative father whose right to prevent the
adoption of his illegitimate child by the mother’s new husband was in
question. The Court immediately distinguished Quilloin (and indirectly
Lehr) from Stanley, observing that “Stanley left unresolved the degree of
protection a State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a
situation, such as that presented here, in which the countervailing
223
interests are more substantial.” In both Quilloin and Lehr, the
countervailing interest was represented by the mother’s new husband
and the child’s would-be father, who represented the promise of a new
nuclear family in which the child would presumably thrive. This prospect
of a functional family unit outweighed the claim of biology, effectively
marginalizing and displacing the unwed father who remained unattached
and unaccounted for in any nuclear family. In other words:
Faced with the prospect of recognizing the rights of an itinerant
unmarried father—that is, a father who failed to comport with the
paternal norms developed in the context of the marital family—the
Court chose to sever paternal rights, allowing the child to be adopted
224
into a marital family.

Beginning the Lehr opinion with a poetic nod to the changing
circumstances and iterations of family life, Justice Stevens wrote: “The
intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They
are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with
225
strength, beauty, and flexibility.” He changed course, however, and
finished the thought by stating, “In deciding whether this is such a
case . . . we must consider the broad framework that has traditionally
been used to resolve the legal problems arising from the parent-child
226
relationship.” This broad legal framework meant a preference for the
formal family—or, at the margin, family arrangements that resembled
the formal family. Justice Stevens elaborated: “The institution of
marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal entitlements
of family members and in developing the decentralized structure of our
222. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). At issue was a question of what types of fathers had the right to notice of
adoption. Id. at 249–50. The relevant New York statute required that notice be given to unwed fathers
whose paternity had been adjudicated, who were identified as the father on the child’s birth certificate,
who lived openly with the child and the child’s mother and thereby held themselves out to be the
father, who had been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written statement, and who
were married to the child’s mother before the child was six months old. Id. at 251. Outside these
categories, the State also provided notice to the unwed father if he had registered with the putative
father registry. Id. at 250–51. Jonathan Lehr did not fit into any of the statutory categories and had
failed to enter his name into the putative father registry. Id. at 251–52.
223. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248.
224. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 27, at 1254.
225. 463 U.S. at 256.
226. Id.
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democratic society. In recognition of that role . . . state laws almost
227
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.”
Operating within this logic in Quilloin, the Court was sympathetic to
the interests of the new husband and would-be father, because he—not
228
Leon Quilloin—represented the male in the “family unit.” Restating
and agreeing with the prior holding of the Georgia Supreme Court,
Justice Marshall wrote:
The majority relied generally on the strong state policy of rearing
children in a family setting, a policy which in the court’s view might be
thwarted if unwed fathers were required to consent to adoptions. The
court also emphasized . . . that the adoption was sought by the child’s
step-father, who was part of the family unit in which the child was in
fact living, and . . . . unlike the father in Stanley, appellant had never
229
been a de facto member of the child’s family unit.

Supporting this logic, and invoking the best interest of the child, the
Court reiterated that denial of adoption rights to Quilloin was not unfair
230
because he had never “sought[] actual or legal custody of his child” and
because “the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition
to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned,
231
except appellant.” The result desired by the unwed father had little
importance because he had exempted himself from the right to protest
by being an absent family member who did not participate in the family
unit.
Caban v. Mohammed—one of the few cases that came out in favor
of the unwed father—confirmed this theory of the importance of the
232
formal or nuclear family. A year after Quilloin, Caban came before the
Court with a story about an unwed father who surmounted stereotype
not only by living with the mother of his children as if married but also by
marrying another woman after the mother of his children left him,
233
thereby proving his stability as a partner as well as a parent. Abdiel
Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together from 1968 through 1973,
and “represented themselves as being husband and wife, although they
234
never legally married.” During that time, the couple had two children
235
and Caban was listed on the birth certificates as the father. In 1973,
236
Mohammed left Caban and took the children. She married Kazin

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 256–57.
434 U.S. at 253.
Id. at 252–53.
Id. at 255.
Id.
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id.
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Mohammed and, not long after, Caban married as well. Several years
later, when Mohammed’s husband petitioned to adopt the two children,
238
Caban and his new wife submitted a cross-petition.
In deciding Caban’s rights with respect to his children, the Court
239
focused heavily on the presence of a “natural family” during the time
that the children were growing up. Caban had been a part of the nuclear
family and a daily presence in the household. In fact, the Court stated:
“There is no reason to believe that the Caban children . . . had a
relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of
240
their father.” Caban had stayed with Mohammed and the children until
she left him and subsequently married—another instance in which their
story broke with stereotype in that the mother was the one to leave the
241
relationship. Furthermore, Caban married after Mohammed left him,
242
attaching himself to a new nuclear family. Consequently, Caban did not
demonstrate the same lack of partnering and parenting skills that the
other unwed fathers were perceived to exhibit. “Mediating between a
father and his rights to his biological children [was] the institution of
243
marriage.” Caban’s willingness to partner in marriage and marriagelike relationships was ultimately what made him a good parent, as these
qualities contributed to providing the children with “the stability of a
244
normal, two-parent home.” In Quilloin and Lehr, the mediation of
marriage condemned the unwed father to exclusion and judgment. In
Caban, however, this mediation worked in favor of the “unwed” father
245
who happened to be a married man. In each circumstance, the Court
237. Id.
238. Id. at 383. New York’s domestic relations law at the time provided that consent to adoption
was required by either parent of a child born in wedlock, but for a child born out of wedlock, only the
consent of the mother was necessary. Id. at 386–86 (citing N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 (McKinney
1977)).
239. Id. at 389.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 382.
242. Id. at 383.
243. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 645. Fineman suggests that this focus on the marital relationship
happens with mothers as well: “The wider academic and policy communities share with feminists a
seeming inability to look at the mother-child relationship (or other versions of the caretakerdependent relationship) without reflexively refocusing the discussion back to the dynamics of marriage
and the interactive responsibility of the marital couple.” Fineman, supra note 25, at 12.
244. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
245. Even though the Court found Caban to be a deserving father, the Court did not disallow the
possibility that generally “unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn
infants.” Id. at 389. The opinion did mention that “this generalization concerning parent-child
relations would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child
increased.” Id.
Caroline Rogus has said, referring to Caban: “Even when striking down impermissible genderbased generalizations in statutes, the Court reinforced the stereotype that women are natural
caretakers and therefore assume the role of mother when they give birth.” Caroline Rogus, Comment,
Conflating Women’s Biological and Sociological Roles: The Ideal of Motherhood, Equal Protection,
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confirmed the notion that a “man becomes a father by relating to his
246
child in the context of family.”
2. Child Support and the “Daily Supervision of the Child”
When unwed fathers were not able to gain parenting rights or even
to block the adoption of their children, they were hindered not only by
their failure to function as part of a family unit but also by a perceived
failure to invest in the family and to thereby earn family rights and
belonging. In both Quilloin and Lehr, the Court chose to focus on what
the unwed fathers failed to contribute, rather than what they actually
invested in the family. Unlike in the statutes of limitation cases, where
the Court demonstrated concern for the unwed mother and tried to
understand the possible impact of being an unwed parent on an
individual’s emotional and psychological state, here the Court displayed
no such inclination or sympathy. Certainly in the case of Lehr, the
majority spun a one-sided story that ignored the unwed father’s attempts
to contribute to the care of the child. The Court selectively took into
account the idea of earned family, and the evaluation of a father’s earned
treatment was indexed to the related evaluation of a father’s
participation in a nuclear family. When the father failed as a member of
the natural, nuclear family, then he also failed to earn belonging. The
natural connections theory, therefore, illustrated the limitations of
earned belonging.

and the Implications of the Nguyen v. INS Opinion, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 803, 811 (2003).
This perspective on the existence and development of a unique mother-child affective bond was
amplified in a dissent penned by Justice Stevens. Caban, 441 U.S. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Drawing on sociological and anthropological research, Justice Stevens indicated that “by virtue of the
symbiotic relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and the initial contact between
mother and child directly after birth a physical and psychological bond immediately develops between
the two that is not then present between the infant and the father or any other person.” Id. at 405 n.10.
Justice Stevens admitted circumstances in which the father might be given a voice in adoption decisions,
but he remained adamant that “as a matter of equal protection analysis, it is perfectly obvious that at the
time and immediately after a child is born out of wedlock, differences between men and women justify
some differential treatment of the mother and father in the adoption process.” Id. at 406–07.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stewart concurred with Justice Stevens, saying “unwed mothers and
unwed fathers are simply not similarly situated” and repeating the truism that “the vast majority of
unwed fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply uninterested.” Id. at 398–99 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Rogus states that:
The Court has invariably conflated the ideal of motherhood with the idea of birth. Such
confusion of sociology and biology, while at times appearing to benefit women via better
treatment under custody or citizenship statutes, in the end succeeds only in perpetuating
“fixed notions” of “the roles and abilities” of women.
Rogus, supra at 814 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996)).
246. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 672; see Linda Kelly, The Alienation of Fathers, 6 Mich. J. Race &
L. 181, 188 (2000). Kelly discusses the Supreme Court’s assumption in these cases that the “unwed
biological father could not have a valuable relationship with his child” and that any parental
obligations would always be “assumed by the married woman’s husband.” Id.
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In Quilloin, Leon Quilloin argued that he had rights stemming from
the fact that he paid his child support and that his interests were
“indistinguishable from those of a married father who is separated or
247
divorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child.” The
Court, however, quickly determined that the two types of interests were
248
“readily distinguishable.”
Although appellant was subject . . . to essentially the same childsupport obligation as a married father would have had, . . . he has
never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
249
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.

Making the implicit assertion that all married fathers performed
these significant responsibilities tied to caretaking and child rearing, the
Court dismissed the possibility of family arrangements that operated
outside of the nuclear family. In addition, the Court discounted the
notion of earned rights to family based solely on economic support. The
Court glossed over the fact that Quilloin had provided economic support
250
for his child—noting that it was provided “only on an irregular basis” —
251
and that Quilloin had visited the child on “many occasions,” bringing
252
“toys and gifts.” Rather, the Court relied on the mother’s judgment
“that these contacts were having a disruptive effect on the child and on
253
appellees’ entire family.”
Similarly, in Lehr, although the father had lived with the mother of
the child before the child’s birth and had visited her in the hospital when
she gave birth, the Court focused on the fact that the couple never lived
254
together after the child’s birth. The opinion mentioned that “he [had]
never provided them with any financial support, and he [had] never
255
offered to marry appellee.” Citing to Quilloin and the requirement that
a parent shoulder “significant responsibility with respect to the daily
256
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child,” the Court
reiterated the idea that there was an equation between the work invested
into parenting and the rights available to the parent. Part of that work

247. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 251.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1983).
255. Id. at 252. The suggestion that the father ought to have offered himself in marriage to the
mother implicitly reflected the historical idea that a man could remedy a crime of seduction through
an offer of marriage. See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2012)
(“Seduction statutes routinely prescribed a bar to prosecution for the offense: marriage. The
defendant could simply marry the victim and avoid liability for the crime.”).
256. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
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was being a daily presence in the child’s life and being based in the same
household. Part of that work was, as the majority suggested, making an
offer of marriage to the child’s mother.
Rejecting this narrative as biased, Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion, proclaiming that the plurality in
Lehr chose to overlook that “from the time Lorraine was discharged
from the hospital until August 1978, she concealed her whereabouts from
257
him.” The dissenting opinion told a different story about the unwed
father, painting a picture of a man who “never ceased his efforts to locate
Lorraine and Jessica and . . . . when he did determine Lorraine’s location,
he visited with her and her children to the extent she was willing to
258
permit it.” Lehr had “offered to provide financial assistance and to set
259
up a trust fund for Jessica,” but the mother had refused this offer. Not
only was there an alternate view of family, the dissent suggested, but also
an entirely different set of facts available. Ignoring this suggestion,
however, the plurality found that Lehr had not sufficiently participated
in the family unit and denied his due process claim, just as the Court had
260
dismissed Quilloin’s claims five years earlier. The collective lesson was
that investment—economic and other—in the family, while necessary,
was not sufficient to earn unwed fathers a place at the family table unless
paired with the belonging in and subscription to the idea of the nuclear
261
and natural family as constructed by the Court.

257. 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 267–68 (majority opinion).
261. The Court continued to reiterate the ideas that unwed fathers were lesser parents, that
mothers had a biological advantage in parenting, and that sex-based categories in the context of unwed
fathers were acceptable. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001);
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam). Justice Ginsburg dissented in both
Miller and Nguyen, and Flores-Villar was a 4–4 per curiam decision with Justice Kagan not
participating. Dissenting in Miller, Justice Ginsburg used the historic household theory to argue her
point. 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She observed that the legislature was “shaping
government policy to fit and reinforce the stereotype or historic pattern.” Id. She proceeded to document
the historical legal treatment of children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, beginning in 1790,
showcasing the way in which assumptions concerning unwed mothers and fathers were not inevitable
conclusions but rather cultural constructs indexed to particular historical moments. See id. at 460–68.
Justice Stevens, using the natural connections theory in writing the opinion, stated that the
gender categories did not represent outdated forms of stereotyping but rather the “undisputed
assumption that fathers are less likely than mothers to have the opportunity to develop relationships.”
Id. at 444 (plurality opinion). This differential was tied to the process and act of childbirth: “[D]ue to
the normal interval of nine months between conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even
know that his child exists, and the child may not know the father’s identity.” Id. at 438. For a
discussion of Ginsburg’s focus on history and use of the historical argument, see Collins, supra note
197, at 1669. “Justice Ginsburg used the history of American citizenship law as evidence that gender
stereotypes have functioned in citizenship transmission since the Founding, and to intimate that § 1409
is a modern, father-disadvantaging incarnation of ongoing discriminatory practices.” Id. at 1680; see M.
Isabel Medina, Real Differences and Stereotypes—Two Visions of Gender, Citizenship and
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Conclusion
Three lines of logic—history, nature, and earning—provided distinct
modes of analysis with which to build advocacy arguments and ground
judicial reasoning. Historical argument, as developed by Ginsburg,
succeeded best when showcasing points of disjuncture between the
historical and the modern, signaling the outdated nature of the
regulation in question. The historical household theory was bolstered by
a broad and widely accepted meta-narrative about the evolution of the
family from patriarchal hierarchy—in which the “obligations and rights
accorded people within families stemmed from the inexorable nature of
262
the ties that linked the members of a family together” —to equalized
263
unit. Arguments from history flagged this evolution in household
practice for the Supreme Court and called for the law to be responsive to
social change, lest regulation be predicated on faulty or inapt assumptions.
The theory of natural connections, on the other hand, offered a very
different way of considering the family and its composition. The natural
connections argument was based on the idea that the nuclear family
possessed an inherently optimal structure and that the work of
legislatures and courts was to support this form whenever possible.
Replacing the nuclear family was not an option; the nuclear family was, if
264
anything, “merely in need of adjustment or minor modification.”
According to this logic, biology was indeed destiny and the ability to
parent was not created by social conditions but rather by innate talent
indexed to gender. Consequently, when the Court relied upon
anthropological ideas about the nature of the family to provide an
understanding of how the spouses and parents fit into the family unit,
arguments about historical stereotyping and marginalization held little
sway.

International Law, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 315, 317 (2004).
262. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 638. In the historical view of the family, expressed in the doctrine of
domestic relations and the master-servant relationship, “obligations and rights accorded people within
families stemmed from the inexorable nature of the ties that linked the members of a family together.”
Id. Conventional histories hold that these structures were softened or displaced by the end of the
nineteenth century. “But as one begins to scrutinize particular bodies of nineteenth-century law, it
becomes clear that such changes did not eradicate foundational status structures: In gender, race, and
class relationships, the legal system continued to allocate privileges and entitlements in a manner that
perpetuated former systems of express hierarchy.” Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1116 (1997).
263. Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:” Toward a History of Family
Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819, 833. Depicted as a story of progress, the traditional outline of family law
treated the disabilities legally imposed on wives (and children) as outmoded restrictions giving way
over time, allowing for increased affirmative rights for women both within the family and in relation to
the commercial and public worlds. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family,
67 Tul. L. Rev. 955, 972–75 (1993) (“The movement toward individual rights in the family during this
century may be seen as part of a more general liberal progression . . . .”).
264. Fineman, supra note 23, at 404.
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The third way, earned belonging, represented a step forward in time
and outlook and embodied a particularly American desire to reward
merit rather than birth. Earned belonging was democratic and embodied
the idiom of “just deserts.” Creating blinders where gender and other
markers of difference were concerned, earned belonging allowed courts
to evaluate performance rather than status and made it easier for
historically disadvantaged classes to gain access to rights and resources.
For this reason, the concept of earned belonging complemented
historical analysis by providing a new logic to replace that of historical
hierarchy. The cases concerning wives and illegitimate children
illustrated the virtues as well as the success of the earnings logic. When
Ginsburg and her colleagues pushed the Court to reject the historical
household, they offered the earnings idea as a less hierarchical and more
democratic mode—and, in the majority of cases, the Court supported the
proposed substitution.
The Court’s application of the natural connections theory, however,
demonstrated the limits of the earned belonging theory. In the adoption
cases following Stanley, biology and not individual contribution
predetermined the capacity of the unwed father to parent. In these cases,
the Court brushed aside extenuating circumstances—as well as facts
supporting the parenting efforts and ability of the unwed father—and
invoked “human experience” and “sociological and anthropological
research” to support the constitutionality of letting particular sex-based
differences stand. Instead of rewarding unwed fathers for providing
financial support or visiting their children, the Court penalized them for
being irresponsible and failing to marry the mothers of their illegitimate
265
children. The Court, unwilling to question the supposed biology of
parenting, was unable to assign value to contributions that came in
266
unconventional forms and from “‘deviant’ family units.” In this way,
the plight of unwed fathers brought into sharp focus the failing of earned
belonging theory by demonstrating how a court’s calculation of earnings
could be biased and how certain contributions could easily be discounted
when the natural connections theory cast its long shadow.
Nonetheless, the theory of earned belonging cleared a broad
expanse of space for gender-neutral arguments and judgments about
267
family inclusion to flourish by creating a “neutral, functional description”

265. As one New Jersey court summarized: “Filiation statutes are generally considered to
represent an exercise of the police power for the primary purposes of denouncing the misconduct
involved, punishing the offender or shifting the burden of support from society to the child’s natural
parent.” State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); see Katherine Baker, Bargaining
or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 1, 7 (2004).
266. Zingo & Early, supra note 198, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. Id.
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for families. When making determinations about individual rights
according to the earned belonging theory, courts could no longer rely on
stereotypes to determine a wife’s proper entitlements, the rights of an
illegitimate child to claim family benefits, or—in theory—the fitness of
an unwed father as a parent. Earned belonging offered a democratic
vision of the family, pairing equal rights with equal contribution, and
pointed a way past the lattice of barriers that both history and nature had
built.
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